论文标题
法规和边境住房供应
Regulation and Frontier Housing Supply
论文作者
论文摘要
法规是住房供应的主要驱动力，但通常很难直接观察。本文估计了边境成本，不存在监管的住房的非土地成本以及监管税，该税量量化了货币条款的监管。在多户住房的多户住房以及仅使用公寓价格和建筑高度的城市环境中工作，我们表明边境是从供求冲击的支持而没有求助于工具变量的情况下确定的。在新的以色列住宅建设的申请中，并考虑了随机住房质量，估计的平均监管税为房价的48％，在各个地点之间存在很大差异。更高的法规与靠近市中心，密度较高和更高价格有关。我们通过假设质量和需求之间的（弱）互补性来制定监管税的下限，以使质量在位置和时间上系统地差异。价格上涨后，最有用的是，在我们的样本期结束时，价格最高，我们将监管税限制在40％（使用2公里半径）和53％之间。
Regulation is a major driver of housing supply, yet often difficult to observe directly. This paper estimates frontier cost, the non-land cost of producing housing absent regulation, and regulatory tax, which quantifies regulation in money terms. Working within an urban environment of multi-floor, multi-family housing and using only apartment prices and building heights, we show that the frontier is identified from the support of supply and demand shocks without recourse to instrumental variables. In an application to new Israeli residential construction, and accounting for random housing quality, the estimated mean regulatory tax is 48% of housing prices, with significant variation across locations. Higher regulation is associated with proximity to city center, higher density, and higher prices. We construct a lower bound for the regulatory tax that allows quality to differ systematically over location and time, by assuming (weak) complementarity between quality and demand. The bound is most useful after prices have increased, so that at the end of our sample period, with prices at their highest, we bound the regulatory tax between 40% (using a 2km radius) and 53%.
