论文标题
GACHA游戏：当潜在理论达到最佳定价时
Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了将单位商品出售给具有前景理论偏好的买家的最佳定价过程。在存在概率加权的情况下，买家动态不一致，对自己的不一致可能是精致的或天真的。如果买家天真，那么独特的最佳机制是出售一个``抢劫盒''，该机制在每个时期内都以一定的概率提供了好处。相比之下，如果买家是精致的，那么独特的最佳机制会引入最差的保险：在从所有以前的战利品盒中获得商品的连续失败之后，买家就可以以全价购买商品。
I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own inconsistency. If the buyer is naive, the uniquely optimal mechanism is to sell a ``loot box'' that delivers the good with some constant probability in each period. In contrast, if the buyer is sophisticated, the uniquely optimal mechanism introduces worst-case insurance: after successive failures in obtaining the good from all previous loot boxes, the buyer can purchase the good at full price.
