论文标题
RISC-V行业中SE-IN-SOC的基于飞地的T恤
An Enclave-based TEE for SE-in-SoC in RISC-V Industry
论文作者
论文摘要
SOC中的安全元素（SE）认为行业中的采用越来越多。 IoT设备中的许多应用程序都绑定到SE，因为它提供了强大的加密功能和物理保护。尽管SE-IN-SOC为软件程序提供了强大的隔离隔离，但它还为PCB董事会构建带来了更多的设计复杂性和更高的成本。更重要的是，SE-IN-SOC仍可能存在安全问题，例如恶意软件安装和用户模仿。在这项工作中，我们采用Tee（一种由硬件支持的安全技术）来保护SE-IN-SOC和RISCV。特别是，我们使用RISC-V提供的固有安全性原始剂来构建各种用于隔离应用程序和操纵SE的飞地。使用硬件和软件共同设计，该解决方案确保了可信赖的执行和应用程序之间的安全通信。 SE的安全性受到强制执行由可信赖的飞地控制的SE并使RISC-V核心对侧通道攻击的弹性。
Secure Element (SE) in SoC sees an increasing adoption in industry. Many applications in IoT devices are bound to the SE because it provides strong cryptographic functions and physical protection. Though SE-in-SoC provides strong proven isolation for software programs, it also brings more design complexity and higher cost to PCB board building. More, SE-in-SoC may still have security concerns, such as malware installation and user impersonation. In this work, we employ TEE, a hardware-backed security technique, for protecting SE-in-SoC and RISCV. In particular, we construct various enclaves for isolating applications and manipulating the SE, with the inherently-secure primitives provided by RISC-V. Using hardware and software co-design, the solution ensures trusted execution and secure communication among applications. The security of SE is further protected by enforcing the SE to be controlled by a trusted enclave and making the RISC-V core resilient to side-channel attacks.
