论文标题
块双提取攻击：预扣块可能是自毁的
Block Double-Submission Attack: Block Withholding Can Be Self-Destructive
论文作者
论文摘要
工作证明（POW）是基于区块链的加密货币中采用的SYBIL控制机制。它阻止了恶意演员操纵分布式分类帐的尝试。比特币通过接受最长的功率链成功抑制了双重支出。尽管如此，Pow遇到了围绕采矿竞赛的几个重大安全问题。其中之一是预扣（BWH）攻击，可以利用称为采矿池的广泛而合作的环境。这次攻击利用了采矿池和参与代理之间的不信任关系。此外，由于采矿池的性质，检测或回应攻击是具有挑战性的。但是，在本文中，我们建议BWH攻击也有可比的信任问题。由于BWH攻击者无法完全控制BWH代理商，因此他们可以背叛归属采矿池，并通过与受害者交易寻求进一步的福利。我们证明，这种背叛不仅在所有攻击参数中有效，而且还提供双重好处。最后，这是BWH代理商的最佳策略。此外，我们的研究表明，与他们的意图相反，BWH攻击可能会遇到自己的收入自我毁灭。
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a Sybil control mechanism adopted in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. It prevents the attempt of malicious actors to manipulate distributed ledgers. Bitcoin has successfully suppressed double-spending by accepting the longest PoW chain. Nevertheless, PoW encountered several major security issues surrounding mining competition. One of them is a Block WithHolding (BWH) attack that can exploit a widespread and cooperative environment called a mining pool. This attack takes advantage of untrustworthy relationships between mining pools and participating agents. Moreover, detecting or responding to attacks is challenging due to the nature of mining pools. In this paper, however, we suggest that BWH attacks also have a comparable trust problem. Because a BWH attacker cannot have complete control over BWH agents, they can betray the belonging mining pool and seek further benefits by trading with victims. We prove that this betrayal is not only valid in all attack parameters but also provides double benefits; finally, it is the best strategy for BWH agents. Furthermore, our study implies that BWH attacks may encounter self-destruction of their own revenue, contrary to their intention.
