论文标题
在空间多数席位上投票，选民数量均匀（Vis-Vis奇数）：注释
On spatial majority voting with an even (vis-a-vis odd) number of voters: a note
论文作者
论文摘要
在本说明中，我们考虑（多维）空间多数投票的情况。我们表明，在本文中常规的一些假设下，如果投票情况的核心是辛格尔顿（以及政策领域的内部），那么偶数的选民，那么核心中的要素从来都不是condorcet的赢家。这与奇数选民发生的情况形成鲜明对比：在这种情况下，在相同的假设下，众所周知，如果投票情况的核心是非空的，那么核心中的单个要素也是Condorcet赢家。
In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and in the interior of the policy space) then the element in the core is never a Condorcet winner. This is in sharp contrast with what happens with an odd number of voters: in that case, under identical assumptions, it is well known that if the core of the voting situation is non-empty then the single element in the core is the Condorcet winner as well.
