论文标题
禁止盒子？信息，激励措施和统计歧视
Ban The Box? Information, Incentives, and Statistical Discrimination
论文作者
论文摘要
“禁止盒子”是指旨在禁止雇主征求申请人信息的政策运动，该信息可用于统计上歧视申请人类别（尤其是具有犯罪记录的申请人）。在本文中，我们探讨了有关申请人身份的信息性特征的隐藏或揭示如何直接影响雇用以及在平衡方面均通过改变申请人投资人力资本的激励措施。我们表明，存在雇主和申请人关于是否禁止盒子的情况。具体而言，根据劳动力市场的结构，禁止框可能是（1）帕累托（Pareto）主导，（2）帕累托（Pareto）主导，（3）在损害雇主的同时使申请人受益，或者（4）在损害申请人时使雇主受益。我们的结果具有超出就业决策的政策影响，包括房东使用信用检查和大学入学中的标准化测试。
"Banning the Box" refers to a policy campaign aimed at prohibiting employers from soliciting applicant information that could be used to statistically discriminate against categories of applicants (in particular, those with criminal records). In this article, we examine how the concealing or revealing of informative features about an applicant's identity affects hiring both directly and, in equilibrium, by possibly changing applicants' incentives to invest in human capital. We show that there exist situations in which an employer and an applicant are in agreement about whether to ban the box. Specifically, depending on the structure of the labor market, banning the box can be (1) Pareto dominant, (2) Pareto dominated, (3) benefit the applicant while harming the employer, or (4) benefit the employer while harming the applicant. Our results have policy implications spanning beyond employment decisions, including the use of credit checks by landlords and standardized tests in college admissions.
