论文标题
对共同利益的投资：自由骑手效应和混合策略平衡的稳定性
Investment in the common good: free rider effect and the stability of mixed strategy equilibria
论文作者
论文摘要
在对共同利益的投资游戏中，自由骑手问题可以以混合策略平衡的形式延迟利益相关者的行动。但是，最近已经表明，随机战争的混合策略平衡甚至是由于玩家之间的不对称程度即使是一点点的不对称程度。这种极端的不稳定与被广泛接受的观念相反，即混合策略平衡是消耗战争的标志。在这个难题的激励下，我们在共同利益的随机投资游戏中寻找混合的策略均衡。我们的结果表明，尽管不对称，但如果该模型考虑了重复的投资机会，则存在混合策略平衡。仅当不对称性足够高时，混合策略平衡才会消失。由于混合策略平衡的效率不如纯策略平衡效率，因此它可以通过例如不对称补贴来促进利益相关者之间足够高度的不对称性来防止政策制定者来防止它。
In the game of investment in the common good, the free rider problem can delay the stakeholders' actions in the form of a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, it has been recently shown that the mixed strategy equilibria of the stochastic war of attrition are destabilized by even the slightest degree of asymmetry between the players. Such extreme instability is contrary to the widely accepted notion that a mixed strategy equilibrium is the hallmark of the war of attrition. Motivated by this quandary, we search for a mixed strategy equilibrium in a stochastic game of investment in the common good. Our results show that, despite asymmetry, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists if the model takes into account the repeated investment opportunities. The mixed strategy equilibrium disappears only if the asymmetry is sufficiently high. Since the mixed strategy equilibrium is less efficient than pure strategy equilibria, it behooves policymakers to prevent it by promoting a sufficiently high degree of asymmetry between the stakeholders through, for example, asymmetric subsidy.
