论文标题
中位半层次中的策略 - 防止汇总规则，并应用了偏好聚合的应用
Strategy-proof aggregation rules in median semilattices with applications to preference aggregation
论文作者
论文摘要
提供了整个策略范围的综合规则的两种特征，这些规则在有限的联接联接 - 偏 - 米拉门奶酪中的本地单峰预定范围内的富域中进行了表征。特别是，这表明这种阶级精确地由联盟Poset的某些秩序过滤器的某些家庭诱导的普遍弱赞助规则组成。因此，共同体规则和许多其他包容性汇总规则属于该类别。对奇数剂的界限规则的特征是表征，并且表现为condorcet-kemeny中位数规则。还考虑了对包括Arrowian社会福利功能在内的偏好汇总规则的应用。存在防止策略的匿名，弱中性和一致的社会福利功能，这些功能是根据总预订的任意概况定义的，并满足了适当放松的独立条件，这表明我们的特征是遵循的。
Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of generalized weak sponsorship rules induced by certain families of order filters of the coalition poset. It follows that the co-majority rule and many other inclusive aggregation rules belong to that class. The co-majority rule for an odd number of agents is characterized and shown to be equivalent to a Condorcet-Kemeny median rule. Applications to preference aggregation rules including Arrowian social welfare functions are also considered. The existence of strategy-proof anonymous, weakly neutral and unanimity-respecting social welfare functions which are defined on arbitrary profiles of total preorders and satisfy a suitably relaxed independence condition is shown to follow from our characterizations.
