论文标题
随机初始化解决了沙普利的虚拟戏剧反例
Random Initialization Solves Shapley's Fictitious Play Counterexample
论文作者
论文摘要
1964年，莎普利（Shapley）设计了一个游戏家族，虚构的比赛未能融入纳什（Nash）均衡。这些游戏是两人非零和每个玩家的纯策略。沙普利认为，每个球员在第一轮中都采用了特定的纯策略。我们表明，如果我们使用随机（混合）策略配置文件初始化，我们能够收敛到本班的代表性游戏的大约1/3时间的NASH平衡。
In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player. Shapley assumed that each player played a specific pure strategy in the first round. We show that if we use random (mixed) strategy profile initializations we are able to converge to Nash equilibrium approximately 1/3 of the time for a representative game in this class.
