论文标题
领导者在全球游戏中的信号传导作用
The Signaling Role of Leaders in Global Games
论文作者
论文摘要
领导者在促进协调方面的行动有多重要？在本文中，我们研究了它们在全球游戏框架中的信号传导作用。一个知情的领导者和一个追随者团队面临着协调问题。尽管领导者的行动产生了内源性信息，但我们提供了必要且充分的条件，使单调平衡策略概况独特地$δ$ - 合理化，因此保证了平衡唯一性。此外，独特的平衡是完全有效的。当领导者观察到关于真实状态的嘈杂信号以外，除了无法获得完全效率外，该结果仍然有效。我们讨论了结果对广泛现象的含义，例如采用绿色技术，货币攻击和革命。
How important are leaders' actions in facilitating coordination? In this paper, we investigate their signaling role in a global games framework. A perfectly informed leader and a team of followers face a coordination problem. Despite the endogenous information generated by the leader's action, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that makes the monotone equilibrium strategy profile uniquely $Δ$-rationalizable and hence guarantees equilibrium uniqueness. Moreover, the unique equilibrium is fully efficient. This result remains valid when the leader observes a noisy signal about the true state except full efficiency may not be obtained. We discuss the implications of our results for a broad class of phenomena such as adoption of green technology, currency attacks and revolutions.
