论文标题
在关节传感器传感器网络攻击下对离散事件系统的建模和控制
Modeling and Control of Discrete Event Systems under Joint Sensor-Actuator Cyber Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们研究了离散事件系统中的联合传感器传感器网络攻击。我们假设攻击者可以通过更改观测和控制命令同时攻击某些传感器和执行器。由于网络攻击引起的观察和控制中的无确定性，监督系统的行为变得不确定，并可能偏离安全规范。我们定义了所有可能的语言上的上限，这些语言可以由监督系统生成，以调查网络攻击下的安全监督控制问题。在引入了CA可控性和CA-观察性之后，我们证明，仅当给定的规范语言是可控制的，并且可遵守CA-CA-CAS-CA-OBS-CAN-CANBER攻击下的监督控制问题。此外，我们获得了在传感器攻击下计算状态估计的方法，并综合基于州立的主管以在网络攻击下实现给定的安全规范。我们进一步表明，在所有解决方案中，拟议的基于州基于国家的主管是最大的遗嘱。
In this paper, we investigate joint sensor-actuator cyber attacks in discrete event systems. We assume that attackers can attack some sensors and actuators at the same time by altering observations and control commands. Because of the nondeterminism in observation and control caused by cyber attacks, the behavior of the supervised system becomes nondeterministic and may deviate from the safety specification. We define the upper-bound on all possible languages that can be generated by the supervised system to investigate the safety supervisory control problem under cyber attacks. After introducing CA-controllability and CA-observability, we prove that the supervisory control problem under cyber attacks is solvable if and only if the given specification language is CA-controllable and CA-observable. Furthermore, we obtain methods to calculate the state estimates under sensor attacks and to synthesize a state-estimate-based supervisor to achieve a given safety specification under cyber attacks. We further show that of all the solutions, the proposed state-estimate-based supervisor is maximally-permissive.
