论文标题
将液体民主推广到多机构代表团：投票权度量和均衡分析
Generalizing Liquid Democracy to multi-agent delegation: A Voting Power Measure and Equilibrium Analysis
论文作者
论文摘要
在这项研究中，我们提出了对液体民主的经典模型的概括，该模型允许分数投票权重，同时允许存在平衡状态。我们的方法使代理商有能力分区并将其投票委托给多个代表，同时保留了自己的一小部分投票权。我们引入了代表团链长度的惩罚机制。我们讨论了经典模型合理概括的理想特性，并证明较小的惩罚因素使该模型更加接近满足这些特性。在随后的一节中，我们利用拟议的投票措施探讨了一般代表团游戏中的平衡状态。与古典模型相反，我们证明了该游戏表现出纯粹的策略纳什均衡，取决于对代表团链的长度施加惩罚。
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to partition and delegate their votes to multiple representatives, all while retaining a fraction of the voting power for themselves. We introduce a penalty mechanism for the length of delegation chains. We discuss the desirable properties of a reasonable generalization of the classic model, and prove that smaller penalty factors bring the model closer to satisfying these properties. In the subsequent section, we explore the presence of equilibrium states in a general delegation game utilizing the proposed voting measure. In contrast to the classical model, we demonstrate that this game exhibits pure strategy Nash equilibria, contingent upon the imposition of a penalty on the length of delegation chains.
