论文标题
自动竞标中单一激励兼容性的脆弱性：ROI受限的在线广告市场的理论和证据
Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
拍卖设计文献中的大多数工作都假定，竞标者根据每个单独拍卖的信息进行理性的行为，启示原则使设计师能够限制他们的努力以兼容兼容（IC）机制。但是，在当今的在线广告市场中，拍卖设计的最重要的现实生活应用之一，最佳投标所需的数据和计算能力仅适用于平台，并且广告客户只能通过设定绩效目标和限制其代理自动示例来参与该平台。自动铸造的流行率需要对拍卖理论进行审查。在本文中，我们通过ROI约束价值最大化广告系列的镜头来研究市场。我们表明，第二个价格拍卖具有许多不良的特性（计算硬度，非单调性，投标人的实用性不稳定和在A/B测试中的干扰），并且在单项场景中失去了其主要的理论优势。此外，我们清楚地表明，IC及其亚军的相互依赖性如何对每个属性做出贡献。我们希望我们的工作能够为社区带来新的观点，并使从业者有益于对现实世界的更好掌握。
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms. However, in today's online advertising markets, one of the most important real-life applications of auction design, the data and computational power required to bid optimally are only available to the platform, and an advertiser can only participate by setting performance objectives and constraints for its proxy auto-bidder provided by the platform. The prevalence of auto-bidding necessitates a review of auction theory. In this paper, we examine the markets through the lens of ROI-constrained value-maximizing campaigns. We show that second price auction exhibits many undesirable properties (computational hardness, non-monotonicity, instability of bidders' utilities, and interference in A/B testing) and loses its dominant theoretical advantages in single-item scenarios. In addition, we make it clear how IC and its runner-up-winner interdependence contribute to each property. We hope that our work could bring new perspectives to the community and benefit practitioners to attain a better grasp of real-world markets.
