论文标题
与说服力进行筛查
Screening with Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了一个非线性定价模型，卖方可以控制产品定价（筛选）和购买者有关其价值（说服）的信息。我们证明，最佳机制始终由有限的许多信号和项目组成，即使具有连续的买家价值观。卖方最佳地汇总买方价值并降低产品种类，以最大程度地减少信息租金。我们表明，即使值分布超过了临界阈值，即使值池对于有限的值分布也是最佳的。我们还提供了足够的条件，在这些条件下，最佳菜单将产品限制为单个项目。
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents. We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical threshold. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal menu restricts offering to a single item.
