MILITARY ANDCOMMERCIAL HIGHWAY TRANSPORT1 BYMAJORBRAINERD TAYLOR2,USA Thepaperisapresentation ofapractical solution forthecoordination ofmilitary andcommercial trans portwithrailandwatertransport. Thenecessity forcombining andcoordinating transportation facilities withtheideaoforganizing ahomogeneous transporta tionnetwork ofwaterways, railways andhighways, provedtobetheessenceofsuccessinmilitaryopera tionsduringtheWorldWar.Theutterinadequacy of pre-warandwar-time transport facilities, whenorgan izedintheseparate fieldsofrailroad, maritime shipping andportoperations, andthedecentralized elements of highway transport, causedtheUnitedStatesArmyto makeacomprehensive studyandplanoftheworld's war-time transportation withparticular attention to theorganization ofmotortransport asthenecessary factorincoordinating alltransportation facilities. The salientfeatures andgeneralprinciples ofthisstudy andtheresultant planarestated. TheresultsofthisstudyareappliedinanArmy plantocoordinate theNation's network oftranspor tationfacilities. TheplanisofferedbytheWarDe partment asapieceofnationaltransportation research influenced bymanyfactorsbasedupontheworld's greatest experience intransportation. Itcontemplates, finally,theestablishment intheCityofWashington ofaNational Highway Transport BoardorCommis sion,andofaGeneralDirector ofTransportation, ora GeneralTrafficBoard,tocoordinate alltransportation facilities. Theprincipal advantages claimedforthisArmyplan aretheattainment ofthefullpotential capacity of motortransport asarevenue-producing public-carrier service;thecoordination ofrail,waterandhighway transportation sothatallthreeservices willsupple mentoneanother,especially interminaloperations; and ageneralcooperative actionthroughout theNation's commercial, civilandmilitary establishments, toeffect thebroadest National benefits. Itisageneralengi neeringplanleadingtowardbettersocialandeconomic conditions andagreatlystrengthened nationaldefense. 1Cleveland Automotive Transportation Meetingpaper.Copyright 1923,byBrainerd Taylor. 2Major, Quartermaster Corps,CityofWashington. 780 Downloaded from SAE International by University Of Newcastle, Thursday, October 04, 2018Downloaded from SAE International by University Of Newcastle, Thursday, October 04, 2018MILITARY ANDCOMMERCIAL HIGHWAY TRANSPORT 781 WORLD WARTRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT InmakingpublicArmyexperiences intransportation andArmyrecommendations fororganizing highway transportation incommerce, theWarDepartment has twointerests: First;itisearnestly desiredthatthe Armyshallcontinue torenderpeace-time serviceofpub lievalueintheindustrial lifeoftheCountry. Second; thesuccessofallnational-defense plansdependsvery largelyuponthecapacityandpowerofourcommercial transportation systems, viewedasanational network of coordinated railway, waterway andhighway transport services. Ourgreatest national problem intheWorldWar wasthe"mobilization ofman-power andsupplies." In thisstatement "mobilization" mustbeusedinitsbroad estsensetoincludeallmovement throughout thewar frompointsoforigintopointsofoperation. Anything wecangaininnormaltimestowardsolvingtheproblem ofmobilizing ournational resources intimeofgreat disaster willbeabigstepinpreparing fornational defense. THEEVOLUTION OFTRANSPORT Outstanding features ofprewartransportation may wellbesummarized inthefollowing sentences, express ingoldprinciples andpoliciesthatprovedfutileduring themostcriticalperiodsofthewar.Separatetransport enterprises, suchasrailroadcompanies, steamship com panies,coastalandinlandwaterway lines,expresscom panies,motorbus andcoachcompanies, taxicabcompan iesandallmannerofsmall,privately ownedvehicles, bothanimalandmotor-drawn, madeupthesumtotalof transportation sofarasgeneral knowledge wascon cerned. Terminal andportenterprises, suchasware housing,although closelyrelatedtotransportation, were oftenorganized independently ofanycarriercompany andwereseldomthoughtofasapartoftransportation. Throughout alltheseseparate enterprises theruling pol